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1. Central questions and answers
“The problem of linguistic data and evidence is in the air.” The first sen-
tence of this highly compelling book places the work in the very center of
recent metatheoretical discussions in linguistics. By reference to an article
by M. Penke and A. Rosenbach (2004, 480), authors Kertész and Rákosi
(K&R henceforth) note that the current issue is not whether linguistics is
an empirical science and thus whether empirical evidence is available at
all but rather, what type of empirical evidence should be used and how.
The primary thrust of the book is not to tell linguists how they should
go about their tasks; rather, it is to hold up a mirror that reflects the often-
tacit assumptions that linguistic work has been rooted in and to propose a
realistic metatheory of linguistic theorizing in tight fit with actual practice.
The central questions pertain to the nature of data and evidence and
their function in linguistic theorizing. Emerging from a systematic and
tightly-structured argument, the answers to these questions are supplied
by a novel metatheoretical framework: the plausibility model (p-model).
Rather than attributing certainty, absolute consistency, context-indepen-
dence, and immutability to the results of linguistic theories and the data
that they are based on, this model offers a liberalized view of data and
evidence by highlighting the uncertainty, possible inconsistency, context-
dependence, and changeability of argumentation.
In what follows, first an overview of the structure of the book is pre-
sented (section 2). Section 3 discusses three seminal ideas of the book and
their general implications, followed by a few concluding thoughts (sec-
tion 4).
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2. Overview
Chapters 1 and 21 – stating the main questions and summarizing the an-
swers – book-end the central body of the text. The issues of data, evidence,
and argumentation are approached by way of five sub-problems taken up
in turn in the five parts of the book. Paralleling the structure of the entire
volume, each part also begins with questions and ends with answers.
The five chapters (2–6) of Part I, “The state of the art” are devoted
to the first sub-problem: what are the answers that have been provided to
the issues of data, evidence, and argumentation in the current literature
and what are the metascientific background assumptions revealed by these
views (7)?1 In surveying the literature, K&R identify two problems. First,
they detect a gap between the metatheoretical principles that researchers
explicitly subscribe to and their actual analytic practice. Most linguists
would claim adherence to the standard view of the analytical philosophy
of science and the standard view of linguistic data. According to the tenets
of the analytic philosophy of science, the goal of the philosophy of science
is the justification of theories with the discovery process irrelevant; jus-
tification is based on evidence; empirical scientific theories are deductive
systems; and scientific theories have to conform strictly to the norms of
rationality (11).
However, K&R find that in the overwhelming majority of cases, ac-
tual research practice is not in line with these principles (18–22). New
data types and methods have entered the field, such as probabilistic ap-
proaches, computer modeling, and experiments. While generativists tradi-
tionally relied on introspective data, more recently they have also resorted
to corpus data and experimental results. Confidence in the traditional
data-handling methods has diminished as factors influencing the reliabil-
ity of factual information – such as the use of questionnaires and inter-
views – have cropped up.
The second problem identified by K&R is that even though some lin-
guists (Christian Lehmann, Martina Penke and Anette Rosenbach, Carson
Schütze, Robert Borsley and others) have taken a new look at linguis-
tic data by relativizing and weakening the requirements that data and
evidence have been held to, no comprehensive new framework has yet
emerged (40). K&R formulate seven specific questions that are left open
in the literature (42).
1 Numbers in parentheses refer to the page numbers of the reviewed book.
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In sum, the emerging answer to the first sub-problem is that views
and practices regarding the concepts of data, evidence, and argumentation
show two gaps: one between theory and practice, and the other between
the perceived need for new metatheoretical principles and the lack of a
comprehensive new framework.
Growing out of the picture painted in the first part, a second sub-
problem is formulated in chapters 7–11 of Part II, “The p-model:” since
there is a need for a new metatheoretical model, what might such a model
be like? The answer proposed is the plausibility model (160–163). The
defining feature of the p-model is a prismatic and cyclic mode of argumen-
tation aimed at the treatment of uncertain information. The process is not
logical deduction and it does not amount to a calculus (57): in contrast to
logic, the contents, as opposed to forms, of the premises also play a role in
inferencing. Argumentation leads from plausible data to plausible results.
The tools of plausible argumentation are plausible statements and
plausible inferences based on the statements. Plausible statements are
statements associated with a plausibility value (63–79). A statement is
generally neither true nor false: rather, it is more or less plausible. A state-
ment’s plausibility is not inherent in the statement: it depends on the re-
liability of the sources that it derives from. The sources that can count to
determine plausibility are multifarious including individual accounts, his-
torical information, theories, and methodological principles such as sim-
plicity. Plausibility values – plausible and implausible – range between the
two limiting values of truth-with-certainty and falseness-with-certainty.
A statement may also be of neutral plausibility if its source is not sup-
portive either of the statement or its opposite.
A plausible inference (85–128) is an inference from a set of plausible
statements that leads to a more or less plausible result on the basis of the
plausibility values of the premises (99). There is a multiplicity of inferences
in a single argumentation process due to two characteristics of plausible
argumentation: it is cyclic (136–143) and prismatic (143–153). Cyclicity
means that, in view of new data, the researcher may open a new line of
inquiry and explore an alternative solution. Prismaticity means that the
same set of data may be viewed differently depending on the researcher’s
vantage point.
Thus, the results of plausible inferences are not true with certainty or
with a given probability: they are context-dependent (121–127) and thus
change with the context.
While cylicity and prismaticity are distinct notions, they are also re-
lated. It would appear that a new cycle of argumentation necessarily im-
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plies a new point of view – i.e. a prismatic turn in the process. However,
the reverse does not necessarily hold: a new point of view does not require
a new cycle. The complex relationship between the two notions is in need
of for further discussion.
The force of the plausibility model may be demonstrated by comparing
it with two other modes of inferencing: logical deduction and probability
calculation. Take the two statements A and B.
(1) A: X
B: not-X
In terms of two-valued logic, if one of them is true, the other must necessar-
ily be false. Probability calculation assigns a particular probability to one,
from which the status of the other is predictable: if A has 80% probability,
B’s is necessarily downgraded to 20%. Thus, both in two-valued logic and
in probability calculation, the value of one statement implies the value of
the opposite statement. In contrast, plausibility values are independently
defined for A and B and thus both statements may be equally plausible in
the light of information stemming from different sources. From the plausi-
bility value of one statement, one cannot determine the plausibility value
of the other.
While this difference between probability and plausibility is clear, the
two notions are not wholly independent. Probability can be one of the
sources of plausibility but not in reverse. Probabilistic linguistics has been
articulated and applied in actual descriptions; one study from the highly
relevant volume of Bod et al. (2003) is discussed in the book (138–143).
However, a systematic comparison of probability-based and plausibility-
based argumentation remains the task of future work through an exami-
nation of instances where results are probable but not plausible and vice
versa.
Part II suggests that the p-model provides appropriate concepts of
data, evidence, and argumentation. Accordingly, the third sub-problem is
articulated in Part III, “Data and evidence” (chapters 12–14): how exactly
are the concepts of data and evidence defined by the p-model (167)? In
this framework, a datum consists of two parts: a statement of some fact
and a plausibility value assigned to it. Data are merely truth-candidates
rather than being necessarily true. A datum in turn counts as evidence
if it contributes to the comparison of the plausibility of rival hypotheses.
Depending on their role in evaluating hypotheses, evidence may be weak,
relative, or strong. Weak evidence is datum from which a degree of plausi-
bility can be inferred for or against a hypothesis. Relative evidence allows
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us to assign a higher plausibility value to a hypothesis than to its com-
petitors. Strong evidence means that the datum makes a given hypothesis
plausible without providing any support at all to its rivals.
The fourth sub-problem is raised in Part IV, “Application of the
p-model: a case study” (chapters 15–17). The question is about the use
of the p-model in the actual practice of linguistic inquiry (191). By way of
an answer, K&R demonstrate how the process of linguistic theorizing can
be made sense of in the light of the p-model: this is exactly the kind of
argumentation that many linguists have intuitively employed (234). This
answer emerges from a concrete case where the authors show the actual
role that the p-model’s concepts play in solving problems. The example is
Gentner & Wolff’s (1997) study of the interpretation of metaphors. In this
paper, three hypotheses are tested against experimental evidence. K&R’s
reconstruction of Gentner & Wolff’s process of theory-building demon-
strates the crucial role that alternative points of view (prismatic thinking)
and the cycling back to earlier stages take in the argumentation.
Part V, “The answers to the open questions” (chapter 18–20) ad-
dresses the fifth and final sub-problem of the book: providing an elaborate
account of the nature of data, evidence, and argumentation (237). K&R
resume the seven issues formulated in chapter 1 about the diversity of data
and their combinability, their complexity, the role of sources in the reliabil-
ity of the data, the treatment of the uncertainty and possible inconsistency
of the data, and the relationship between data, evidence and theory; and
they propose answers to them.
3. Three seminal ideas
At several points in the book (e.g., 55, 63), K&R refer to plausible argu-
mentation as a cognitive tool whose applicability extends beyond linguis-
tics to other sciences and to everyday discourse. Indeed, a basic insight
that K&R offer in their book is the generality of their concepts. This will
be shown below in regard to three cardinal concepts of the book.
3.1. Prismatic and cyclical argumentation
As noted above, the prismaticity of argumentation consists in the constant
re-evaluation of the evidential context: like a prism, evidence may vary with
the angle from which we view it and it remains fragmentary. Rather than
being linear and unidirectional, argumentation is variable and context-
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dependent. Argumentation is in turn cyclic when the analyst recognizes
that the solution arrived is only one of several possibilities: new information
opens the way to additional cycles of inferencing and in view of the new
evidence, the researcher takes a new stab at the problem. Cyclicity does
not mean circularity: the argument does not return to its own initial stage
but “to a re-evaluated variant of it with altered information content” (160).
These two defining features of the p-model are ubiquitous. In scientific
discourse, they are instrumental in meteorological forecasts, earthquake
predictions, economic forecasts, and medical diagnoses and prognoses: all
of these, too, are based on the constant re-evaluation of evidence. A pop-
ular book of the history of astronomy (Kolb 1996) makes this point in
a particularly stunning way by adopting the title Blind watchers of the
sky. Documented by an analysis of how astronomical understanding has
evolved, the idea behind this striking title is that even though mankind
has been staring at the same sky for thousands of years, what people saw
was not at all the same: different astronomers saw different things and
they re-evaluated their theories multiple times, with the “final truth” still
eluding their grasp.
The idea is familiar from criminal investigations as well. As “who-
done-it”-type crime stories illustrate, investigators start with alternative
guesses associated with sets of plausibility values derived from the ev-
idence supporting them. These values may change in the course of the
investigation depending on the vantage point assumed and on the avail-
able evidence. The detectives may at some point need to turn a new page
and start the process from scratch with a set of revised premises. Simi-
larly, prismatic and cyclic argumentation is evidenced in everyday thought.
When evaluating a book, or a movie, or a piece of art, or a political posi-
tion, or a person, different vantage points may yield different results and
additional considerations may trigger a new assessment cycle.
Much of human concern revolves around two concepts underlying pris-
matic and cyclic argumentation. Prismatic thinking amounts to the recog-
nition of the variability of conclusions; the need for cyclic argumentation
in turn underscores their fallible, temporary status and thus their change-
ability. Variation and change are difficult concepts to live with: they fly in
the face of the human aspiration for answers that are uniquely certain and
will remain so. While in many situations in individual and societal life,
variation and change are coveted, in other contexts, it is uniqueness and
immutability that are held at a premium. Alternative views and changing
views are often looked at askance. Individuals, as well political parties, or-
ganizations, and theories, that entertain alternatives or change their views
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are often judged negatively: they are roundly labeled opportunistic and
unreliable even though what may lie behind such phenomena is a plu-
ralistic, prismatic view of things and the healthy process of re-thinking
positions. As noted by K&R, the plurality of linguistic theories “cannot be
interpreted as a symptom of the immaturity of linguistics. Rather, from
the p-model it follows that it is a constitutive and natural characteris-
tic of linguistic theorizing” (255). The same holds for human thought in
general. By showing that prismatic and cyclic argumentation are basic to
human thought, the plausibility model lays bare the inevitability of the
need for us to embrace variability and change. This recognition lowers the
barrier between linguistic theorizing and theories of other sciences, as well
as between scientific theorizing and everyday human thinking.
3.2. Plausibility
While language and metalanguage share many properties, it is particularly
striking to notice the parallelism between K&R’s focus on the evidential
status of theoretical statements and the meticulous concern that some
languages pay to evidentiality in everyday discourse. In English and other
European languages, the plausibility value of a statement may be indicated
by modal auxiliaries such as may or by periphrasis, such as I think that. . .
or X writes that. . . or according to X. . . Many statements, however, are
not annotated for their degree of reliability and thus they sound like they
are simply true. Political discourse as well as everyday conversation are
full of statements that suggest certainty, whether they have to do with the
causes of things (why something happened), the consequences of actions
(what will happen in the future), and how things would have been in the
past if they had been different (counter-factuality). Statements that lack
plausibility annotation falsely cater to the human desire for truths that
are rock-solid and eternally valid.
However, in many languages around the world, statements that are
not annotated for their reliability are simply ungrammatical. Two collec-
tions of papers, Chafe & Nichols 1986; Aikhenvald & Dixon 2003, attest to
this (cf. also Aikhenvald & Dixon forthcoming). In her introductory paper
to the 2003 volume, Aikhenvald surveys the various evidentiality distinc-
tions observed in languages. Most commonly, languages explicitly mark
reported – “hearsay” – information; this is the case in Enga, a Papuan lan-
guage. More fine-grained distinctions are also amply documented. The
Caucasian language of Godoberi requires an indication whether the in-
formation does or does not come from an eyewitness. Tariana, a language
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of Brazil, has a system that makes a four-way distinction between visual,
nonvisual sensory, inferred, and reported information. The awareness that
K&R’s plausibility model urges of the source-dependent plausibility val-
ues of language-theoretical statements is paralleled by the awareness of the
source-dependent plausibility values that “evidentiality languages” require
for everyday utterences.
3.3. Conflict resolution
As noted above, the two fundamental principles of prismaticity and cyclic-
ity of argumentation are based on two more general notions: variability and
changeability. Prismaticity means there is more than one way of looking
at the same problem; cyclicity means results may change with additional
evidence and new vantage points.
Variation and change are troubling concepts in human life. What is
behind the cognitive hardship of coming to grips with variation and change
is conflict: multiple solutions are in conflict with each other and if solutions
change over time, there is again a discrepancy between them. The notions
of variability and change are inherently contradictory and as such they
undermine our sense of security.
Conflicts of various kinds are a basic phenomenon in individual life as
well as in society and politics; attempts to resolve them engage much time
and human effort. Attempts to deal with conflicts of various sorts have
been a prime mover of linguistic theorizing as well. Conflicts have been
most explicitly addressed in Optimality Theory and analyzed in the large
literature of competing motivations in grammar (cf. for example MacWhin-
ney et al. to appear). In the shaping of language structure, competitions are
palpable between the speaker’s interests and those of the hearer; between
phonological and morphological principles; and in how both semantic ar-
gument roles and informational-structural roles of noun phrases might be
successfully accommodated in syntactic structure. In theory-construction,
many issues have also created apparently contradictory approaches: ad-
herence to different kinds of data, different interpretations of the same
data, and different theoretical assumptions have all constituted seemingly
impenetrable wedges between theorists (cf. Moravcsik 2010).
However, the fundamentally non-absolutistic, pluralistic approach of
the p-model goes a long way toward resolving such conflicts. In his classic
monograph that has served as one of the basic sources for K&R, Rescher
(1976, 1) assigns a prominent role to plausible thinking in conflict resolu-
tion. He writes: “Plausibility theory seeks to provide a rational instrument
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for dealing with cognitive dissonance.” As noted above, in the p-model, in-
consistencies are not a fatal fault to an argument: the logical contradiction
between a premise and its negation may be accommodated by assigning
different plausibility values to them, or, by a paraconsistent move, relegat-
ing them to different contexts; or by simply tolerating them on a temporary
basis (247–249; cf. also Kertész & Rákosi 2013).
4. Conclusions
Emerging from about two decades of work by the authors that has yielded
a rich roster of publications (see the list of references in the book), this
volume summarizes and crystallizes Kertész and Rákosi’s concept of lin-
guistic metatheory. The p-model provides a realistic image of linguistic
analysis and theorizing: what data are and what linguists can do with
the data. Ideals such as linear and relentlessly consistent argumentation,
unique solutions to problems, and a search for truth with certainty are off
the agenda. Instead, argumentations are shown to be prismatic, cyclic, and
tolerant of contradictions; solutions are multiple and fallible, and, rather
than absolute truth, the goal is to arrive at conclusions that are maximally
plausible at a certain stage of research.
While the plausibility model compromises traditional goals and tools,
it also grants more freedom to the researcher. Certain truth offers security
but is limiting; uncertainty is liberating since it opens up possibilities.
According to the p-model, linguists are not prisoners to immutable data
and strictly logical deductions: they are to some extents masters of the
facts and the conclusions that can be drawn from them. The p-model’s
pluralistic approach to linguistic theory also weakens the walls that often
separate theorists of different persuasions and softens the conflicts among
them.
Due to its rigorously-organized structure and the many examples
taken from various theoretical frameworks, the text articulates the frame-
work clearly and makes its points in a reader-friendly manner. The struc-
ture of the discussion is transparent: questions and answers define the out-
line of each chapter and of the book as a whole. Most chapters are short
and are divided into sections; previews and summaries abound; varying
fonts help to draw attention to key points. Footnotes are in the back but
since the pertinent page numbers are given on the top of the footnote
pages, they can be located easily. The only occasional hardship is refer-
ences to numbered items that appeared many pages earlier. Repetition of
these items or tagging them with short mnemonic phrases might have been
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useful to jog the reader’s memory and thus make it unnecessary to search
for the items in the text.
Continuing the line of argument of their earlier work on the topic
(e.g., Kertész 2004a;b; Rákosi 2005; Kertész & Rákosi 2009; 2013), K&R’s
present book is a new contribution to the cognitive science of science. It
provides novel insight into the understanding of general human cognition
through the analysis of how linguists view language structure. The book
is accessible both to linguists and to philosophers of science.
On the final pages of the book (260–262), K&R note that the central
ideas of the p-model are themselves the outcome of plausible argumen-
tation and thus they will have to compete with their rivals in further
argumentation cycles. This fact, however, does not diminish the timeliness
and significance of their suggestions. A comment from language-typologists
Nicholas Evans and Toshiki Osada underscores the point. Evans’ and
Osada’s original paper concerned the issue of whether Mundari did or
did not have word classes such as nouns and verbs; their conclusion – that
it did – was subsequently questioned by others who interpreted some of the
same data differently and drew different conclusions. At the close of their
response to these alternative analyses, Evans and Osada remark (2005,
456):
“Recent years have seen considerable convergence in descriptive and analytic
practices. [. . .] We have made less progress in standardizing the practices of
argumentation, yet until we make these explicit we will be left with a situation
where what counts as evidence for one linguist will be deemed irrelevant by
another. [. . .] The very different responses of our distinguished commentators
show how far we still are from having an agreed set of rules of argumenta-
tion within word class typology. [. . .] Because the assumptions that underlie
argumentation are so numerous, and interact in so many ways, developing a
set of convergent rules of argumentation is a huge task for the field.”
K&R’s book is a significant step towards identifying realistic principles of
argumentation that apply across linguistic theories, across different sci-
ences, and across scientific discourse and everyday human thinking.
Edith A. Moravcsik
University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee
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Mary Dalrymple and Irina Nikolaeva: Objects and information structure.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. pp 247.
1. Introduction
Objects and Information Structure by Mary Dalrymple and Irina Niko-
laeva (henceforth D&N) is a recent addition to the Cambridge Studies in
Linguistics series of Cambridge University Press. It is a book-length explo-
ration of a new kind of approach to differential object marking (henceforth
DOM) and object marking patterns in general: the authors argue that the
effects of information structure on object marking across languages are
pervasive and have to be taken into account when dealing with the phe-
nomenon of DOM, to a higher degree than is usually assumed.
While not focusing on information structure only, D&N claim that in
languages that no longer show direct effects of topicality in DOM, seman-
tic features associated with topics (definiteness, specificity and animacy,
for example) play a role (p. 2). At least indirectly, then, they claim that
the topicality of objects is a relevant factor in DOM cross-linguistically
and diachronically. D&N’s analysis is couched in an LFG framework. The
relevant features of this system are introduced in roughly the first half of
the book before D&N move on to analyse a wealth of cross-linguistic data
to support their hypothesis.
I will provide a overview of the structure of the text before discussing
a few points in more detail.
1.1. Structure and contents
In their introductory chapter, D&N’s introduce the basic concept of DOM
with data from a range of languages. One particularly welcome aspect
of their study is that they treat languages with differential agreement
(e.g., Hungarian, varieties of Ostyak [or Khanty, Finno-Ugric] and Nenets
[Samoyedic]) on a par with languages showing differential case marking by
showing that the same kinds of restrictions hold for both types. The au-
thors provide a good overview of accounts of DOM in different frameworks:
approaches analysing the function of DOM as distinguishing arguments,
helping the recoverability of referents of arguments, as well as transforma-
tional approaches.
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Approaches stressing the distinguishing function of DOM argue that
when a given object has properties that are more typical of subjects (e.g.,
definiteness or animacy), morphological marking on the objects (as op-
posed to zero marking) serves to disambiguate the arguments of the pred-
icate. While this logic underlies much work on DOM, D&N argue for a
different approach. They do not agree with the hypothesis that DOM high-
lights differences between typical and atypical objects, they rather suggest
that DOM highlights “similarities between subjects and topical objects
[. . .] as opposed to nontopical objects” (p. 15, their emphasis). A crucial
part of this analysis is the LFG notion of grammatical function, such as
subj, obj and objθ. These correspond to the subject, the primary object
and the secondary object, respectively. The latter is restricted to certain
semantic roles (reading θ as a variable over these). D&N aim to show that
the obj function – which shares some properties with the subj function – is
what marked objects across languages are mapped onto. This accounts for
the similarities in the syntactic behaviour of subj and obj functions (as
opposed to objθ).
Chapters 2–4 introduce in some detailthe LFG machinery that is as-
sumed throughout the book, which is another welcome feature of this book.
While, in later chapters, the formalism is only invoked to indicate the
language-specific analyses of DOM, D&N provide an explicit framework
that allows for a compositional semantic analysis of sentences as well as a
mapping of referents to information structure (cf. in particular their dis-
cussion in section 4.3). I will come back to their discussion of the notions
‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ topic below.
In chapters 5–9 the authors discuss the relation of topicality and gram-
matical marking with respect to different kinds of arguments. Chapter
5 discusses the role of topicality in singling out arguments that trigger
marking. Again, this marking includes markers on the object NP (e.g.,
Ayacucho Quechua, Japanese), as well as in verb morphology (e.g., Aleut).
D&N go on to discuss the frequent mapping of topic to subjecthood across
languages. Chapter 6 turns to discuss the mapping of topicality to non-
subject arguments. Again, the discussion includes both case marking and
agreement, and is extended not just to objects, but also obliques.
DOM comes into play in chapter 7: in the languages under discussion,
such as Tundra Nenets (Samoyedic), Tigre (Semitic) and Dolakha Newar
(Tibeto-Burman), D&N argue that only topical objects can trigger case
marking or agreement, but other grammatical functions cannot. Other
than that, they suggest, objects that do and do not trigger marking display
identical syntactic behaviour. However, there are additional restrictions:
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in Tundra Nenets, some indefinite determiners, like ‘some’, never trigger
agreement, independently of topicality.
In chapter 8, D&N introduce a slightly different kind of DOM: lan-
guages like Northern Ostyak (Finno-Ugric), Mongolian and Hindi are ar-
gued to involve not just a difference in topicality with respect to marking
but a difference in grammatical function: objects bearing the obj trig-
ger differential marking while objects bearing the objθ role do not. D&N
further illustrate that the two roles show differences in their syntactic be-
haviour.
Chapters 9–11 include discussion about ditransitives and possible
mappings between objects and grammatical functions (9), as well as
sketches of diachronic and typological relations between different kinds
of DOM (10). Chapter 11 briefly summarises and concludes.
2. Discussion
The book is generally very clearly written and structured. Chapters 5–8, in
which different kinds of phenomena are introduced, are highly systematic
and serve the purpose of illustrating the parallels between case marking
and agreement with respect to topicality very well. These chapters cover
an impressive range of languages from different genera for which D&N
generally argue convincingly that topicality is in some way involved in
object marking.
To illustrate the interaction of topicality, semantic roles and gram-
matical functions in D&N’s terms, I will consider their analysis of North-
ern Ostyak (chapters 8 and 9). This language shows complex mappings
between grammatical functions, information structure roles, and semantic
roles. For example, it has a subj role which must be topical but can appear
with several semantic roles like agent or patient/theme (in passivised
clauses). As for objects, D&N argue (following earlier work by Nikolaeva
1999a;b; 2001) that objects that trigger agreement show syntactic differ-
ences from objects that do not. First, objects that trigger agreement are
freer in their syntactic position; they do not have to immediately precede
the verb (p. 145). In addition, this kind of object can control coreference
in certain kinds of embedded clauses, cf. (1):
a.(1) [xuli u:n u:l-m-al pata] xuli / ∅i nox an ta:l-s-e:m
fish large be-an-3sg because fish out not carry-past-obj.1sgsubj
‘I didn’t take out the fish because it was large.’
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b. *[xuli u:n u:l-m-al pata] xuli / ∅i nox an ta:l-s-@m
fish large be-an-3sg because fish out not carry-past-1sgsubj
‘I didn’t take out the fish because it was large.’ (D&N: p. 147, (16), (17))
Only the object triggering agreement (cf. ta:l-s-e:m ‘I took out’ in (1a)) can
control coreference on the embedded subject xul ‘fish’, the object in (1b)
cannot. Objects that trigger agreement share this (and other properties)
with subjects. While Nikolaeva (N) has argued in earlier work that this
is due to the topicality of the object (it being topical in (1a) but not in
(1b)), D&N argue (p. 148) that the grammatical function and its mapping
to semantic roles provide a better explanation. D&N explain the different
syntactic behaviour by arguing that objects that do trigger agreement
have the obj function which can have different semantic roles like goal
and theme/patient, whereas objects that do not trigger agreement have
the function objtheme/patient which is restricted to the single semantic
role of theme/patient.
As D&N (p. 149) point out, then, agreement in Ostyak “can be
straightforwardly characterised in terms of the grammatical function obj”
or what they call the primary object. Topicality only plays a role for
theme/patient objects, as other roles like goal or causee can control
agreement independently of their topicality. Thus in (2a), a:n ‘cup’ can be
obj or objθ, depending on whether it is a topic or not. In the first case, it
triggers agreement, in the second it does not. In (2b), on the other hand,
a:n-na is an oblique, and the goal role is realised as obj, obligatorily
triggering agreement.
a.(2) ma a:n Pe:tra e:lti ma-s-e:m / ma-s-@m
I cup Peter to give-past-obj.1sgsubj give-past-1sgsubj
‘I gave a/the cup to Peter.’
b. ma Pe:tra a:n-na ma-s-e:m / *ma-s-@m
I Peter cup-loc give-past-obj.1sgsubj give-past-1sgsubj
‘I gave a/the cup to Peter.’ (D&N: p. 148, (18))
Notice that the mapping between obj and the information structure role
of topic is not fixed, as shown in (3a,b) (original glosses), answers to the
question “Whom did he make cry?”, with the causees ‘me’ and ‘Peter’
obligatorily triggering agreement, even though they are in focus (given
(2)).
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a.(3) ma:ne:m xo:ll@-pt@-s-li / *xo:ll@-pt@-s
I.acc cry-caus-past-obj.3sgsubj cry-caus-past-3sgsubj
‘He made me cry.’
b. Pe:tra xo:ll@-pt@-s-li / *xo:ll@-pt@-s
I.acc cry-caus-past-obj.3sgsubj cry-caus-past-3sgsubj
‘He made Peter cry.’ (D&N: p. 149, (20))
D&N conclude that “mapping rules in Ostyak must include reference to
information structure roles” (p. 149) but their examples show that this
only concerns the question of which (object) function a theme/patient
object is mapped onto. This role can be realised as subj (when topical and
passivised), obj (when topical) or objtheme/patient (when nontopical).
2.1. GOALs and topicality
Northern Ostyak is one of several languages that show an interesting sim-
ilarity between arguments carrying the goal role and those triggering
DOM. D&N mention (pp. 191–192) the often cited observation that the
morphology of DOM is in many languages the same as the morphology
marking goal arguments — this is the case in Ostyak, where goals which
are not obliques always trigger agreement. For D&N, who cite research
stating that “ditransitive goals are inherently more topical than theme ar-
guments” (p. 192), this fits well with their idea that (secondary) topicality
is related to DOM: if goals are likely topics, then it might not be sur-
prising that the theme/patient role (to which “the goal is superior [in
topicality]”; p. 192) is expressed similarly when topical. I will come back
to this point below.
2.2. Cross-linguistic variation
Languages can and do differ in the mappings between grammatical func-
tions, information structure roles and semantic roles: in Tundra Nenets
(Samoyedic), another Uralic language, the identical syntactic behaviour
of objects triggering agreement and those that do not leads D&N to sug-
gest that the language has only one object function, namely obj. Both
nontopical and topical objects map onto this function, while goals are
always expressed as obliques, independently of information structure.
Thus, D&N can represent cross-linguistic variation as differences in
mapping between grammatical functions, information structure roles and
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semantic roles, as well as the inventory of grammatical functions a lan-
guage has. There can be certain restrictions on these mappings, such as
that differential marking targets the theme/patient role but not oth-
ers (other roles being consistent, as discussed above for Northern Ostyak
goals always triggering agreement).
What kind of cross-linguistic predictions can this framework make?
While the mapping rules seem to be fairly free, the inventory of grammat-
ical roles is probably restricted, cf. the case of Tundra Nenets with only
one obj role. D&N further assume “spreading” and “narrowing” of DOM
(pp. 208ff.), suggesting that the set of noun phrases triggering marking
can be expanded (spreading) or reduced (narrowing) diachronically and
provide examples for these processes.
These, together with different mapping rules, allow them to suggest
a typology of three types of DOM (pp. 215–216): (i) Languages in which
DOM only relies on information structure (Northern Ostyak); (ii) Lan-
guages which only rely on semantic properties for DOM but not on infor-
mation structure (Hebrew, arguably Spanish and Turkish); (iii) Languages
in which information structure and semantic properties interact (Hindi,
Tundra Nenets).
What all these languages have in common is that it is (by assump-
tion) always the obj function that is morphosyntactically marked, either
triggering agreement or case marking, as opposed to the objθ function.
2.3. Open questions?
Before concluding, I want to raise two more points that I think are worth
mentioning. The first of these concerns the idea of secondary topicality.
This is not a concept that originates in D&N’s work, N in particular has
used it in earlier work to explain object marking in Northern Ostyak.
Nikolaeva (2001, 26) defines a secondary topic as an element such that “the
utterance is construed to be about the relationship it and the primary
topic” (emphasis in original). While D&N discuss this notion in some detail
(p. 54ff.), its usefulness is not quite clear to me. They state that secondary
topics are “less pragmatically salient for the speaker than the primary
topic.” This might well be the case, but it seems that in the description of
given languages ‘secondary’ could just be treated as a label stating that a
certain topic is not the first one.
Consider a difference between Northern Ostyak and Tundra Nenets.
The former language has grammaticalised an obligatory connection be-
tween subject and topic (cf. p. 146). D&N argue that this implies that a
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(theme/patient) object triggering agreement must be a secondary topic.
It does not become clear whether treating such a topic merely as a second
topic (the subject being the first one) would have any negative conse-
quences. Given that D&N argue for subjects being most prominent on
syntactic grounds anyway (p. 102), any effect on salience or prominence of
a second topic could follow from its not being the subject-topic.
Other languages are freer in their assignment of the topic role to ar-
guments: Tundra Nenets does not have a subject-topic restriction, there-
fore the verb can agree with a topical object without their being another
topic noun phrase (p. 129). Note also that in the formal representations of
i(nformation)-structure that D&N provide both topics are merely stated
to have the topic role (p. 89), not a primary and a secondary one. The
theoretical use of the notion ‘secondary topic’ in this context thus seems
doubtful.
A final issue concerns the relation of goals and themes, briefly
mentioned above. D&N argue that topical themes behave like goals
in some languages, even receiving the same morphological expression.
D&N state (p. 221) that in their framework grammatical functions are
not defined configurationally but are primitives of the system. This, I
think, raises an interesting possibility for a comparison of analyses of
DOM across frameworks. López (2012) argues, in a Minimalist setting,
that DOM is inherently configurational. On his approach, an direct ob-
ject (a theme/patient) triggering DOM moves to a position higher
than the indirect object (a goal). López (2012) provides data includ-
ing quantifier scope, binding effects and object control to argue that DOM
objects are structurally higher than indirect objects and non-DOM ob-
jects. It is particularly interesting that some of the languages in question
are analysed both by López and D&N, albeit not with the exact same
data. A possible advantage of a configurational approach could be that
the similarities between goal objects and theme objects that trigger
agreement would come ‘for free’, since syntactic positions might be the
closest analogue to D&N’s grammatical functions in López’s framework.
3. Conclusions
To conclude, Objects and Information Structure is a valuable addition
to the literature on differential object marking. The book is well writ-
ten and very well structured, it has a clear hypothesis and provides a
great amount of relevant data that (mostly) strongly support the au-
thors’ theory. It is also obvious that D&N are extremely well informed
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about DOM and the literature on it and they present data from an im-
pressive range of languages and families: Ayacucho Quechua (Quechuan),
Japanese, Kinyarwanda (Bantu), Aleut (Eskimo-Aleut), Somali (Semitic),
Persian (Iranian), Tariana (Arawakan), Itelmen (Chukotko-Kamchatkan),
to name just a few.
All in all, this book does a very good job in providing an analysis of
certain types of DOM on a wide empirical and theoretically sound basis.
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